What limitation exists for public figures in pursuing IIED claims?

Public figures face a higher standard when pursuing claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). This standard is rooted in the notion of protecting free speech and the press, as articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. For public figures, to succeed in an IIED claim, they must demonstrate that the defendant made false statements about them with actual malice, meaning that the statements were made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.

This requirement acknowledges the importance of robust discourse about public figures, as they voluntarily expose themselves to public scrutiny. The necessity to prove actual malice acts as a deterrent against frivolous lawsuits aimed at quelling criticism or dissent directed towards those in the public eye.

The other options do not correctly reflect the standards associated with IIED claims for public figures. For instance, public figures do not need to prove physical harm to establish their claims, nor are they precluded from pursuing claims against other public figures. Additionally, they are not exempt from claims of emotional distress; instead, their claims are subject to the higher burden of proof concerning actual malice.